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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BEVERLY KAY CHRISTENSEN 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
ALFRED BRENT CHRISTENSEN 
Defendant-Respondent 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16459 
Plaintiff, Beverly Kay Christensen, commenced a civil 
action against the defendant, Alfred Brent Christensen, Case No. 
239969, in the District Court of Salt Lake County, claiming fraud in 
.:::onnection with a divorce decree previously entered by that court in 
Case No. D-20185. During the pendency of the fraud action (No. 
239969), plaintiff filed a motion and order to show cause in the 
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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divorce matter, seeking both modification and enforcement of the 
divorce decree. Both matters were consolidated for hearing. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Both matters were heard before the Honorable Ernest F. 
Baldwin, Jr., on the 14, 15 and 16 days of February 1979. There-
after, and on April 16, 1979, Judge Baldwin entered his order in the 
fraud action (No. 293369), finding in favor of the defendant and 
against the plaintiff, No Cause for Action. He also entered an order 
upon order to show cause in the divorce matter (No. D-20185), 
granting plaintiff partial relief under the petition for enforcement of 
the decree, and denying her claim for modification. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to have the denial of the lower court to 
modify the decree reversed, and to have that aspect of the court's 
decision recommended for further proceedings. Defendant seeks 
to have the lower court's decision affirmed. 
2 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 31, 1975, plaintiff commenced a divorce action 
against the defendant, seeking termination of a 16 year marriage. 
Plaintiff was represented by counsel, who prepared a complaint 
which set forth in substantial detail all of the assets of the marriage 
(R D-20185, p. 2-7). Thereafter, 1he parties and plaintiff's counsel 
negotiated a settlement agreement which was the result of several 
telephone conferences, and at least one face-to-face conference 
between the parties and plaintiff's counsel (T. 164). Plaintiff's counsel 
prepared a stipulation and property settlement agreement which was 
executed by the parties and incorporated into the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce entered by the court. 
During the negotiations and discussions, defendant was 
requested to give his opinion as to the value of the properties of the 
parties, which he did (T. 165, 206, 207). Plaintiff discussed these 
properties and their values with her attorney (T. 32, 33), who 
advised her to have the properties appraised, if she had any questions 
about their values (T. 25, 167), and with Clement Tebbs, a friend 
3 
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and an accountant (T. 32, 137), who also advised her to have an 
appraisal made (T. 137). Plaintiff opted to proceed without additional 
information, and executed and filed the agreement her attorney had 
prepared. 
Plaintiff also, based upon the agreement and the other 
representations to the court, obtained an order waiving the statutory 
90 day waiting period, and the statutory interlocutory period. 
On August 5, 1976, plaintiff filed an affidavit to support 
an order to show cause, claiming that defendant had misrepresented 
the value of the assets, and that she had been prevented by the 
defendant from presenting to the court and fully litigating the issue 
of her rights to the properties acquired during the marriage (R. D-
20185, p. 45-46). Defendant objected, and the Honorable Dean E. 
Conder ruled that plaintiff's relief properly should be sought by a 
separate action. Plaintiff thereafter, on January 13, 1977, com-
menced Civil Action No. 239969, alleging fraud and requesting the 
court to impress a constructive trust upon the property awarded to 
defendant by the Decree of Divorce, and to award damages to 
4 
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plaintiff (R. 229969, p. 2-5). 
Plaintiff's main complaint centers around an apartment 
complex located at 320 Gordon Lane, Salt Lake County, known as the 
Spring Hollow Apartments, and which were listed in plaintiff's 
divorce complaint. Defendant testified that the value of the apartments 
was estimated by him, based upon information given to him by the 
mortgage holder, at approximately $460, 000 (R. 59). Exhibit 20-D, 
the work notes of E. H. Fankhauser, plaintiff's attorney, shows the 
value figure at $485, 000. In addition, plaintiff, prior to exexution of 
the settlement agreement, talked with Clement Tebbs, who gave his 
opinion as to value at $550, 000 (R. 187). All of these estimated values 
were known by plaintiff, and were referred to in her discussions with 
her attorney and, in fact, during one conference with her attorney, 
plaintiff was advised that the proposed settlement would give her 
"about sixty-nine thousand, and him two hundred and three," and that 
the proposal was not reasonable, and for her "not to take it" (R. 162). 
The parties thereafter continued to negotiate, and an agreement was 
made, which plaintiff advised her attorney she wanted to accept, 
5 
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although he still expressed concern over the values used (R. 168). 
Plaintiff was well represented, had made independent inquiries, chose 
not to have the properties appraised, and was in no way excluded by 
the defendant from making any determination she or her attorney 
desired to make. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION. 
The matter of modification of a Decree of Divorce has been 
left to the discretion of the trial court, with the controlling legal 
principal being: 
" that a divorce decree may not be modified 
unless it is alleged, proved and the trial court 
finds that the circumstances upon which it was 
based have undergone a substantial change." 
See Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 U 261, 225 P 76; 
Osmus v. Osmus, 114 U 216, 198 P. 2d 233; and 
Gale v. Gale, 123 U 277, 258 P. 2d 986. 
It has likewise been the position of this court that the public 
interest requires that there l;>e an end to litigation and, as stated in 
Klein v. Klein, 544 P. 2d 472: 
6 
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11 and that judgment having been affirmed by 
this court in July 1973, it became final and 
absolute; and that the trial court could not 
properly change or modify that decree except 
for subsequent change in circumstances. The 
correctness of that proposition under usual 
circumstances and as applied to a definite and 
final judgment and decree in a divorce action, 
to the end that the same matters cannot be litigated 
~' is acknowledged." (Emphasis mine). 
Here, the plaintiff has attempted a two-edged attack on a 
divorce decree that she obtained, based upon an agreed stipulation 
negotiated and prepared by her attorney. She claims fraud on one 
side, and change of circumstances on the other. 
The court heard this matter at length, and all evidence 
presented by plaintiff was presented to support both edges of her attack, 
The trial court was not impressed with the fraud claim of plaintiff, 
and found that there were neither wilful misquotations by defendant, 
fraudulent representations by defendant, concealment of assets or 
financial condition by defendant, nor reliance by plaintiff (R. Case 
No. 239969, p. 80, 81, 82). 
Since the plaintiff is not appealing from the court's finding 
in Case No. 239969, the fraud action, the matter to be considered is 
7 
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whether or not a material change of the circumstances upon whic': -'.: 
decree was based exists. This subject was addressed by this co·~r: '.:: 
the case of Perkins v. Perkins, 522 P. 2d 709, where the court, 
quoting _.\nderson v. Anderson, 13 u2. d 36, 368 P. 2d 264, said: 
" ... the generalization of Title 30-3-5, -Ctah Code 
Annotated 19 53, contemplates an opportuni:y for 
the divorced litigants to come into court :·or modi-
fication of the original decree based upon changed 
circumstances, and that any dissatisfaction wi:h 
such decree is a matter of appeal. _.\bsem on 
appeal, it is not subject to modification except 
where such changed conditions are demonstrated. 
Speaking also to this, the court, in Trego \', Trego, 
565 P. 2d 74, said: 
'''\-hen there has been an adjudication on one se: of 
facts, that should be res adjudicata, and :here 
should be no modification unless some substandal 
change of circumstances would warranT doL11g so. 
It appears from the evidence presented that the plain:::: 
feels that had she followed the advice of her attorney, and had she ·~st: 
the information that was always available to her, that she may ha·:e 
received more by way of property settlement than she agreed rn acce:: 
This all apparently is based upon the great real escate appraisa:. :::: :' 
8 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
perfect hind sight. " >;\'hat she o>-erlooks is that the defendant was 
required to pay all of the mortgages --- whether suificient income 
is generated or not --- and pay all of t..1-ie taxes and property insurance 
on :-ier property and house. These are benefits to her that must be 
considered in reviewing the senlemem agreement. 
In the case of Sorensen v. Sorensen, 20 V. 2d 360, 438 
P. 2d 180, this court said: 
" ... Generally, the court is required to give such 
a decree the final status accorded to any civil 
judgment and to apply the goctrine of res judicata 
thereto . . . Our statute permits subsequent changes 
which are reasonable and proper. This has been 
construed to empower the court to make a modifica-
tion where there has been a substantial change in the 
material circumstances of either one or both of the 
parties since the decree was entered. An application 
for a modification should be subjected to thorough 
s cruriny by the court. " 
It appears that the trial court did subject the request ior 
modification to a thorough scrutiny and, considering all of the facts, 
including the values placed upon the properties by the various witnesses 
before the court, determined that the circumstances since the entry of 
:..'1e decree have not changed sufficiently to warrant a modification to 
9 
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increase plaintiff's property holdings, as she requested. 
Since the trial court did not find the distribution of assets 
to be unjust or inequitable to either party, defendant submits that the 
"latitude of discretion" allowed the trial court in the matter of Klein v. 
Klein (supra) should be allowed the trial court here, and the decision 
should not be disturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
From the evidence, it appears that the court properly 
determined that no change of" circumstances exists, and that appellant's 
complaint before the court is one relative to her dissatisfaction with 
the settlement negotiated by her and her attorney at the time of the 
divorce. 
Under the facts before the court, the determination of the 
trial court should stand. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER R. ELLETT 
Attorney for Respondent 
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